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ABSTRACT
An Alternative Approach to Measuring 
Consumer Discrimination in the 
Market for Baseball Cards
by
Adam Neil Rabinowitz
Dr. Bradley S. Wimmer, Examination Committee Chair 
Assistant Professor of Economics 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The effect of consumer racial discrimination in the market for baseball cards has 
previously been examined (Nardinelli and Simon, 1990; Andersen and La Croix, 1991; 
Gabriel, et ah, 1995; Gabriel, et al., 1999; McGarrity, et a l, 1999; and Fort and Gill, 
2000). Significant differences in the model specification and data are found throughout 
the literature, resulting in very mixed findings. The following study attempts to improve 
on these specifications by replicating the existing work and adding important missing 
variables. I find specification matters and consumer discrimination exists in this market. 
In addition, auction data are used to explore an alternative market price for studying 
discrimination.
Ill
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCnON 
An exhaustive literature exists that examines the effects racial and gender 
discrimination has on market outcomes/ Because extensive records on the productivity 
of professional athletes exist, professional sports provide a unique opportunity to study 
the impact racial discrimination has on related market outcomes/ Baseball trading cards 
have been the recent focus for the study of consumer discrimination by examining 
whether race affects the price of baseball cards.
Baseball cards have a history that dates back over 100 years. What was originally 
a hobby has now developed into a well-organized market made up of dealers, trade 
shows, and individual sellers. The advantages of studying baseball cards are the 
availability of the data, and unlike salary and attendance data used in other studies, the 
price of baseball cards can be measured with little error (Nardinelli and Simon, 1990). 
Researchers using the market for baseball cards have found mixed results regarding the 
impact of race on market prices, similar to the other studies using baseball data.
The purpose of this study is to attempt to explain why the wide range of results in 
the baseball card literature exists. Different studies use different empirical specification 
and data sets. Thus, the first potential source of bias is in the specification and the data
' Becker (1971) is the primary theoretical work associated with the theory of discrimination. 
 ̂Kahn (1991) offers a comprehensive review of discrimination in sports.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
used. To isolate the potential bias introduced by specification, I use a single data set of 
Topps Baseball Cards issued in 1974.  ̂ Using this data set, I empirically estimate a series 
of specifications that follow the existing literature as well as introduce a new series of 
variables for consideration.
The second potential source of bias is the data on prices. Existing literature uses 
Beckett’s Baseball Card Price Guides as a current value for each card. I consider the 
possibility that a bias exists within the Beckett's pricing policy, and use transaction data 
to overcome this difficulty. eBay Internet auctions are used to obtain data on market 
transactions. Internet auctions make it increasingly easier for individuals to buy and sell 
baseball cards in an easily observable marketplace, making it a potentially improved 
source of pricing data to test for the presence of consumer discrimination.
Data from Internet auctions, however, pose other potential problems. Unlike the 
Beckett’s guide that prices cards at equal quality, the quality of cards offered for sale at 
auctions differ significantly. Moreover, because buyers cannot physically inspect the 
cards, problems of asymmetric information arise. Therefore, as a part of this study, I 
begin to examine issues related to certification and reputation, which are believed to 
reduce information problems.
The paper is outlined as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on 
consumer racial discrimination in baseball. Chapter 3 contains a theoretical discussion of 
discrimination and the development of theoretical and empirical models. Chapter 4 
describes the data used in the study and presents the empirical results using book values. 
Chapter 5 examines the eBay auction process, and reviews the existing literature.
 ̂A given year’s baseball card set, such as the 1974 Topps Baseball Card set is issued by the manufacturer 
only in that same year.
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Chapter 6 outlines the model, describes the auction data, and discusses the empirical 
results using market transactions. Chapter 7 concludes the study.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Several studies (Nardinelli and Simon, 1990; Andersen and La Croix, 1991; 
Gabriel, et a l, 1995; Gabriel, et al., 1999; McGarrity, et al., 1999; and Fort and Gill, 
2(M)0) have attempted to determine whether or not consumer racial discrimination is 
present in the market for baseball cards/ These studies have used a variety of different 
specifications and variables that have resulted in a variety of findings. Table 1 reports the 
signs and significance levels of the race variables from the existing literature.
Nardinelli and Simon (1990) conducted the first study examining the factors that 
determine the 1989 prices of 1970 Topps baseball cards. Results of the study determine 
that the cards of both black and Hispanic hitters are valued less than equally productive 
white hitters, with only the variable for Hispanic hitters being statistically significant.^ 
These findings are in contrast to the findings by Andersen and La Croix (1991) who find 
statistically significant discrimination against black hitters in their 1977 data set, yet no 
discrimination in their 1960-61 data set. Neither the 1960-61 or 1977 data sets indicate 
discrimination against Hispanic hitters.
In a study that replicates both of these works using a 1974 data set, McGarrity, et 
al. (1999) are in direct contradiction, finding no statistically significant coefficients for
Stone and Warren (1999) study the market for basketball mading cards issued in 1976-77, finding no 
evidence of consumer discrimination.
 ̂Hitters are defined in this study as baseball players whose primary position is not pitcher.
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black or Hispanic hitters. These results agree with Gabriel, et al. (1995) who also studies 
consumer discrimination using baseball cards from 1984-1990, finding no statistically 
significant discrimination.
Regarding pitchers, Nardinelli and Simon (1990) find that baseball cards of both 
blacks and Hispanics are worth less than whites, all else constant. Both these results are 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Alternatively, Andersen and La Croix 
(1991) find no discrimination in their results. Interestingly, they find in the 1960-61 data 
set, that a premium is paid for above-average black pitchers, and that in 1977, a premium 
is paid for average and below-average black pitchers.
Again, McGarrity, et al. (1999) replicate these works, obtaining different results. 
They find discrimination against above average Hispanic pitchers, although noting that 
only three such players exist. Similar to their results with hitters, Gabriel, et al. (1995) 
find no statistically significant discrimination against black or Hispanic pitchers.
In an alternative assessment of discrimination in baseball cards. Fort and Gill 
(2000) test a single data set of 1987 Topps baseball cards, combining both hitters and 
pitchers into a single regression. In addition, they develop an alternative method of 
measuring race, using a continuous variable as opposed to the discrete measure of 
previous studies. They find discrimination against average black and Hispanic hitters, as 
well as average black pitchers.
In testing for consumer discrimination in the baseball card market, the existing 
literature unanimously agrees that the best data source for obtaining consumers 
willingness to pay for baseball cards comes from the Beckett Baseball Card Price Guide. 
Every year Beckett publishes a complete price guide of all published baseball cards.
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followed by a monthly magazine with updated prices. The minimum value Beckett 
places on a card from a given year labels that card a common card. According to Beckett 
(2000), a common card "has no premium value accruing from subject matter, numerical 
scarcity, popular demand, or anomaly.” These cards, from any given year, are valued at 
the minimum price of any card in the set because collectors may need the card to 
complete an entire set or team. This intrinsic value is unrelated to the performance of the 
player, thus censoring the distribution of prices from below. The baseball card price is 
the dependent variable in these models, and due to the censoring, a Tobit model is used in 
the literature as the standard econometric technique.^
The data and specifications used to test for discrimination are the major 
differences in the literature. Nardinelli and Simon choose baseball cards from 1970 to 
avoid future expectations or speculative pricing. Baseball card prices of young unproven 
players are determined in large part by consumer's expectations of future productivity. 
This type of speculative pricing is impossible to account for completely while a player is 
still active in the major leagues; making identifying the effect race has on prices 
difficult.’ Andersen and La Croix, as well as Gabriel, et al. largely disregard this fact 
using card samples with a significant number of active players.* McGarrity, et al.
* Gabriel, et al. is the exception to this because they only used rookie cards in their sample. These rookie 
cards are all priced higher than the common card, so they use ordinary least squares regressions. 
McGarrity, et at. use both a Tobit and a Sample Selection model.
 ̂An example of a baseball card price that was influenced by expected future performance is the 1984 
Topps rooWe card for Don Mattingly. In March 1990, the card was valued at $30 (Krause 1990).
Mattingly consistently appeared in All-Star games, and in the top 10 in offensive statistical categories prior 
to 1990. After sustaining injuries in 1990, these feats were rare occurrences. In 2001, that same 1984 
Topps rookie card is valued at $8 (Beckett 2001), a prime example o f expectation pricing.
* Andersen and La Croix use two different samples in their study. Their 1960-61 sample does contain only 
retired players, while their 1977 sample contains active players and some form of speculation, which is not 
held constant Gabriel, et al. use only Topps rookie cards from 1984 to 1990, of which the majority of 
these players are still active and are in the prime of their careers at the time of this study. Gabriel, et aL 
(1999) extend this previous work by looking at an older time period of rookie cards of hitters only from 
1974-1982. Using their model from Gabriel, et aL (1995), they find statistically significant discrimination
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recognize this issue and use the 1974 Topps baseball card set of retired players, similar to 
this study. Furthermore, single-year performance data does not accurately capture a 
player’s career ability. It is therefore an accepted practice to avoid this complication by 
using older cards, where all of the players have completed their careers and unbiased 
career data can be used (Nardinelli and Simon, 1990; and McGarrity, et al., 1999).
From 1956 through 1980, Topps was the only manufacturer of baseball cards. 
Before 1974, Topps issued cards over various points during the baseball season. This 
resulted in an unequal production and sometimes scarce series of cards. Beginning in 
1974, Topps issued fixed quantities of each card in the series at the beginning of the 
season. Previous literature refers to this constant production as a constant supply 
(Andersen & La Croix, 1991 ; Gabriel, et al., 1995; and McGarrity, et al., 1999).
However, manufacturers do not sell baseball cards to consumers as individual cards. The 
market for individual baseball cards consists of reselling between individuals and dealers. 
Therefore, supply is driven by participants in the market, that is, the resellers and not the 
manufacturers. In this sense, the supply of cards is not constant because a different 
number of cards are actually offered for sale at different times. Using the 1974 data set 
does control for competition and production of cards. I further address the issue of 
supply in the hedonic model in Chapter 3.
To determine whether or not discrimination exists in the market for baseball 
cards, it is important to control for a player’s performance. It has also been agreed upon
against nonwhite players using 1994 prices, but not using 1983 prices. The 1994 prices are reflective of 
mostly retired players, while the 1983 prices still contain mostly active players. They explain this by 
hypothesizing that expectations reduce discrimination. Therefore, after a player has retired and their career 
statistics are known, card prices begin to reflect consumer discrimination. This idea is inconsistent with the 
findings of Andersen and La Croix’s 1960-61model that indicates the lack of discrimination in retired 
players.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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in the literature that there are difficulties in comparing hitter’s (position players) and 
pitcher’s performance levels as a single group. Only Fort and Gill (2000) combine these 
players in a single analysis. Given the significant differences in the type of statistics 
between hitters and pitchers it is appropriate to consider these two groups independently. 
Beyond these considerations, there is little agreement among the various studies about 
which statistics provide the best measure of performance.
With the wide range of statistics available for baseball players, the existing 
literature uses everything from disaggregate performance statistics, listing each statistic 
as a separate variable, to statistics that aggregate performance into fewer variables. Table 
1 also reports the type of model used by the existing literature. Nardinelli and Simon 
along with Gabriel, et al. use disaggregate performance statistics, while Andersen and La 
Croix use aggregate performance variables.
The use of disaggregate performance statistics is beneficial because it does not 
impose restrictions on measures of performance. However, using a single combined 
variable does present advantages concerning degrees of freedom. Recognizing these 
differences, McGarrity, et al. (1999) estimate both models. Their results show no 
difference between the models, leaving the determination of player performance open to 
either model.
Other popular determinations of a player’s performance have had little 
consideration in the existing literature. Runs-batted-in (RBI) and runs scored are two 
variables that collectors and fans consider of great importance. When looking at baseball 
players, there is a special status given to those that have 100 or more RBIs or rans scored 
in a single season. Beckett (2001) even considers any hitter with more than 1,200 career
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
RBIs to not be a common card. One commonly used and significant variable is the 
number of post-season games in which a player appears. This is important because these 
games receive special attention, promoting greater focus on these players. Such exposure 
creates a greater demand and price for a particular baseball card.
Positions are another variable of interest used in previous studies. Most 
specifications include a dummy variable for catcher, first, second, third, shortstop, and 
outfield, with outfield as the omitted variable. In these studies, most if not all of the 
variables are statistically insignificant. Although it appears as if positions are irrelevant, 
it is necessary to include a designation of a player’s position because certain positions 
result in greater recognition.’
In determining the variables to use to study discrimination, previous literature 
agrees on the necessity for a group of variables that cover demographic, performance, 
recognition, and card characteristics. The literature however, has not been successful in 
modeling all of these characteristics. Recognition has only been addressed by the 
inclusion of seasons as manager and post-season games. Variables that relate to All-Star 
achievements, number of Gold Gloves, MVP and Cy Young awards, and Hall of Fame 
inductee can all account for star status and greater fan recognition. Although these 
variables have been looked at in other contexts of discrimination, no one has considered 
them in the baseball card literature.’® I include these additional variables in this study.
 ̂Various studies have examined discrimination by position in major league baseball determining that white 
players are more heavily represented than blacks in leadership positions, such as catcher and pitcher (Pascal 
and Rapping, 1972; Scully, 1974; Hill and Spellman, 1984; Hide and Irani, 1996). Furthermore, issues of 
segregation have been explored, where Phillips (1991) determined that the segregation against blacks was 
becoming smaller from 1974 to 1988. Guppy (1983) determined that whites are more likely to be infielders 
and blacks outfielders. However, Eide and Irani (1996) determined that when considering individual 
positions, positional segregation increased from 33% in 1961 to 50% in 1990.
See Findlay and Reid (1997); Desser, et al (1999); Hanssen and Anderson (1999); and Jewell, et oL 
(2002) for studies relating to discrimination in Hall of Fame and All-Star voting.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Furthermore, I develop a more formal model in Chapter 3 to discuss the determinants of 
demand and issue of supply in this market.
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CHAPTERS
THEORETICAL MODEL AND EMPIRICAL 
BACKGROUND
Theory of Discrimination 
Becker (1971) identified the theory of labor market discrimination as 
discrimination by consumers, employers, and employees. Based on the proposition that 
individuals have a “taste for discrimination,” they act as if they are willing to pay money 
to avoid interacting with one group over another, holding productivity constant. When 
consuming a product, or hiring workers, people may view dealing with people of a 
different race or gender as having a non-pecuniary cost, which is measured by a 
discrimination coefficient that captures the difference between actual and perceived costs.
The type of discrimination depends on the role played by the person to whom 
attributes, such as race, matter. Consumer discrimination exists when consumers find 
that purchasing a good from an individual of a different race, gender, age, etc. imposes a 
non-monetary cost on them. Employer discrimination exists when an employer refuses to 
hire workers whose value of marginal product is greater than his marginal cost because of 
such non-monetary costs. Finally, employee discrimination exists between coworkers 
when an individual incurs a non-monetary cost by working alongside one individual as
11
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opposed to another. In all of these sources of discrimination, it is assumed that workers 
are perfect substitutes.
Becker proposes that consumers who have a “taste for discrimination” take into 
account whether the workers producing a good are from their preferred racial, ethnic, or 
gender group when making a purchase decision. Becker models this by assuming that 
there is a discrimination coefficient, d> 0, that affects a discriminating consumer’s 
perceived price. To see this more clearly, consider a consumer who belongs to group 
one, has a “taste for discrimination” against group two, and is considering purchasing a 
good with price monetary P. If the consumer purchases the good from a member of 
group two, the perceived price is equal to P(l+cO- Assuming d  equal to 0.5 and P  equal 
to S5, this results in a perceived price of $7.50. Therefore, discriminating consumers do 
not purchase from firms that hire people from group two because the total cost of the item 
is perceived to be higher because of discrimination. To avoid lowering prices or losing 
customers, employers segregate their workforce by hiring workers that cater to customer 
tastes. If employers are successful in segregating their workforce, consumer 
discrimination does not affect the firm’s profitability. However, not all industries can 
segregate in this manner. In this case, prices must be lowered to compensate for the 
additional non-pecuniary cost of consumption, and a loss of profits occurs (Becker 1971, 
and Boijas 1996).
This analysis can be applied to the market for baseball cards. Say that a consumer 
is looking to purchase a baseball card, and is deciding between purchasing a card of a 
white, black, or Hispanic player. These players are equally productive, that is, they have 
identical statistics. The consumer, for some unknown reason, discriminates against black
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and Hispanic players. To determine the dollar impact of discrimination, we can use the 
equation:
(1) {Py,)/(l+d) = PBm
where Pw  is the price of a white player’s card and P b/h is the price of a black or Hispanic 
player’s card. Equation (1) determines the price where the discriminating consumer is 
indifferent between purchasing the baseball card of a white, black or Hispanic player. 
Assuming the actual price of the white player’s card is $5 and a discrimination coefficient 
of 0.5, the price of the baseball card for the equally productive black and Hispanic player 
would have to be $3.33, a perceived price of $5. When marginal consumers behave in 
this manner, consumer discrimination results in lower actual prices for baseball cards of 
black and Hispanic players.
Hedonic Model
The market for baseball cards can be described using hedonic price theory.”  
Hedonic price theory is based on the idea that an individual’s utility for a good is 
comprised of various characteristics. Under certain circumstances, it becomes possible to 
separate the effects of the characteristics of a good in a way that demonstrates each 
characteristics marginal effect on an individual’s utility. Goods that fit within the 
hedonic pricing model are generally a single commodity, differentiated by the amounts of 
the various characteristics they possess. The hedonic price theory model assumes that (a) 
the price of the product is a function of its characteristics; and (b) the range of product 
choices is continuous (Garrod and Willis, 1999).
"  Stewart and Jones (1998) consider a hedonic price function in studying the implicit demand for player 
characteristics by Major League Baseball teams in a salary equation.
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Baseball cards fit this model because they exhibit a wide variety of players with 
different demographic, performance, recognition, and card characteristics. The hedonic 
method is used to estimate the price of these characteristics by differentiating between 
similar products of the same product group. It is possible to describe baseball cards, BC, 
by a vector of its characteristics, Z, where this vector of characteristics contains 
demographic, performance, recognition, and card characteristics. This yields the hedonic 
price function:
(2) PbCj — PbtfZiU •••> Zij, ..., Zin)
which gives the price of the /th baseball card, Pbcp as a function of its characteristics,
where Zij, is the quantity of theyth chaiacteristic provided by card L
In describing how the hedonic price function is used, we assume that all 
individuals in this market behave identically, where their utility depends on the 
consumption of a numeraire good, X,  and the vector of characteristics, Z, that is provided 
by the baseball card purchased.
(3) u = u (X, Z)
If we assume that preferences are weakly separable, demand for characteristics of 
baseball cards are independent of the price of other goods. Therefore, this utility function 
is maximized subject to the budget constraint:
(4) M - P b c Z - X  = 0
where M  is monetary income and Pbc is the price of the baseball card. Taking the first- 
order condition with respect to the vector of characteristics zj, we have:
(5) d u /d z j
------------  =  dP bc/ d z j
d u / d X
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The left hand side is simply the marginal rate of substitution between characteristic zj and 
the numeraire good, X. This can be considered the marginal willingness to pay for the /th 
characteristic, which must equal the marginal cost of purchasing an additional increment 
of the same characteristic. Thus, the right hand side of Equation (5) is the marginal cost 
of purchasing additional zj- This characteristic could consist of demographic factors, 
such as race. Therefore, Equation (5) can illustrate the marginal effect of race on 
baseball card prices.
Considering the utility function, we can obtain bid curves that give the maximum 
amount an individual is willing to pay to obtain a specific characteristic,/, holding all 
else constant. This bid curve takes the form:
(6) Bj = Bj (Zj, Z* u*)
where Z* represents the optimal quantity of all characteristics other than /;  and u* 
represents the solution to the constrained utility maximization problem.
Because different individuals have different preferences and/or incomes, different 
willingness to pay combinations, or bid curves, exist within the market. Each of these 
combinations of characteristics and preferences represents a point of tangency between 
the bid curve and the hedonic price function. Similarly, the supply side of the market is 
represented by a set of offer curves that are derived from the firm’s cost function. For the 
market to be in equilibrium, each offer curve must also be represented by a point of 
tangency to the hedonic price function. Thus, the hedonic price function is a double 
envelope of both the bid and offer curves. And since the hedonic price function depends 
on both the supply side and demand side of the market, each tangency point represents an 
equilibrium between supply and demand (Freeman 1994).
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The most widely used example of hedonic pricing is the housing market, where 
individuals have information on alternatives and are free to choose any house within the 
single market. The baseball card market shares some of the economic structures of the 
housing market, where the selection of characteristics to choose from is fixed, much like 
bundles of housing services. Individuals can increase the quantity of any characteristic 
by finding alternatives that offer more of the desired characteristic, but may also be alike 
in all other respects (Freeman 1994). Although we can separate the marginal price of a 
particular characteristic, the price of a baseball card depends on the level of all 
characteristics considered.
One issue does arise with this pricing method because of the existence of common 
cards. With common cards, it is not possible to observe the effect of a player’s 
performance on card prices, because pricing is censored at a minimum level. Therefore, I 
follow Nardinelli and Simon (1990) who assume that every baseball card has a positive 
intrinsic value that is unrelated to performance.
We can then separate the price of a baseball card, Pbc, into two components:
(7) Pbc = Pc + Pz
where Pc is the log price of common cards, and Pz is the component of log price that is 
related to the player’s vector of characteristics. This can then be rearranged as:
(8) P bc-Pc = Pz
where the left-hand side, Pbc -  Pc, is the adjusted log card price. The right-hand side then 
gives price as a function of the player’s demographic, performance, recognition, and card 
characteristics. Therefore, this specification factors out the “common” component of
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price, and at low levels of performance a baseball card is worth zero. Once a threshold 
has been reached card prices rise as a  function of the various characteristics.
I estimate:
(9) E[PJ=)9'Z, + ^A  + c,
where Z is a vector of player performance, recognition, demographic, and card 
characteristics, excluding race, with being the corresponding vector of coefficients. D 
is a dummy variable that is set equal to one if the player is a minority with coefficient Ô. 
e is a random disturbance term and i indexes observations. The test for discrimination is 
where J < 0  indicates discrimination against blacks or Hispanics, and (5 > 0 
indicates discrimination against whites.
The adjusted log card price o f Equation (9) is zero, and many of these 
observations exist. Both omitting the lower observations, and estimating them through 
ordinary least squares creates a bias (Kennedy 1998). Therefore, I use maximum 
likelihood estimation, and because the data are censored, the Tobit model is employed.
My empirical strategy is to address concerns over the specification and data used 
in the existing literature. I replicate the existing models using 1974 baseball cards and 
2001 prices, a data set that contains only retired players. I add to the literature by 
including the new set of recognition variables that relate to All-Star achievements, 
number of Gold Gloves, MVP and Cy Young awards, and Hall of Fame inductee as well 
as a new series of aggregate performance variables. In doing this, I estimate both a 
hitter’s and pitcher’s model independently.
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Data
To estimate the effect discrimination has on the market for baseball cards, I use 
546 single player baseball cards from the Topps Baseball Cards set issued in 1974.*  ̂
Current prices for these cards are obtained from the 2000 Beckett Baseball Card Price 
Guide, updated from the March 2001 Beckett Baseball Card Monthly/^ The 
performance data used in this study are obtained from The Baseball Archive Database 
(2001). Position data is obtained from The Baseball Encyclopedia (1990).
The variable of most importance is race, which is measured with two dummy 
variables, one for blacks, and one for Hispanics. Black is determined through a 
collaborative effort of a group of individuals looking at pictures of the 1974 baseball 
cards obtained from Topps Baseball Cards: The Complete Picture Collection, A 40 Year
'■ The entire set contains 660 cards. Post season cards, managers, checklists, team cards, and error cards 
are omitted from the study. The 13 San Diego players that were printed with Washington D.C. as their 
team due to speculation of a move are also omitted. The Pete Rose card is omitted because of his ban from 
the Hall of Fame. His statistics are comparable to other inductees, and thus would create a bias. What 
remain are 546 single player cards where all characteristics can be measured. This differs from the study 
by McGarrity, et al. (1999) who also use the 1974 Topps set with 552 cards. The six cards that this study 
omits are because four contain various eirors, one is for Pete Rose, and one is for Ran Healy, which also 
pictures Thurman Munson in the background. All contain factors that affect price that are not measurable.
The March 2001 monthly guide reflects prices in February 2001. This is used to update the annual guide 
because monthly guides do not include all cards, only stars and cards that have deviated in price since the 
annual publishing.
18
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History by Foley, et al. (1990). Hispanic is determined by country of birth, where those 
players bom in Mexico, Central America, Puerto Rico, South America, or the Caribbean 
are Hispanic.*'^ In both variables, a one denotes a player is black or Hispanic, 
respectively, and zero otherwise. Separately, I use a non-white variable in place of the 
individual race variables where a one denotes a black or Hispanic player and a zero 
denotes a white player. Of the entire 546 observations, the majority (390 or 71.4%) are 
white players. Of non-white players, there are almost twice as many blacks (101 or 
18.5%) as there are Hispanics (55 or 10.1%).
Table 2 shows a frequency distribution of the Beckett prices from 1974 Topps 
Baseball Cards. There are 364 common cards valued at $0.50,67% of the 546 
observations used for this study. After common card pricing, there are three additional 
categories of baseball cards that Beckett classifies. Minor Stars, valued at $1.00, Semi- 
Stars, valued at $2.(K), and Unlisted Stars, valued at $3.00 (Beckett 2001).*^ Those cards 
that do not fall into any of these categories are then given different prices, above $3.(X), 
and listed individually in the monthly price guide. All prices within the price guide 
exhibit an incremental pricing method that may result in a potential bias because 
continuous pricing is expected in this market. If performance and other characteristics 
affect the price of a card, the market would not converge to such similar values for 
different players, making this distribution of prices unlikely. However, because previous 
literature has solely relied on this data for prices, I use this as a baseline analysis for a 
comparison with actual transaction prices.
Using this method, it is not possible for a Hispanic to also be black. This is why Fort and Gill (2000) 
prefer to use a continuous measure of race obtained through survey data.
These values are for 1974 Topps cards and vary widely by manufacturer and year.
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Looking at the Beckett classification system in Table (2), only 1 Hispanic player 
has obtained star status while 41.7% of stars are black. Considering the overall 
distribution of cards amongst race, there exists an obvious skew toward black stars. In all 
other classifications, the percentage of each race within that classification is similar to the 
overall percentage of each race to the total population of cards in this study.
The variable names, definitions, and expected signs for the hitter’s model are 
reported in Table 3. In controlling for a hitter’s performance, the disaggregate variables 
are Hits, Doubles, Triples, Home Runs, Walks, At Bats, Stolen Bases, Runs and RBIs, all 
of which are career totals for each individual variable. Disaggregate position variables 
include a binary variable for each individual position. First Base, Second Base, Short 
Stop, Third Base, Outfield, and Catcher. Each variable is denoted with a one if the player 
played the majority of their games at that position, and zero otherwise. Utility, a new 
variable in this research is also a binary variable, assigned a value of one if the player 
played a significant number of games in their career at more than one position.
Aggregate performance variables include Total Bases, Offensive Average, and 
Batting Average. Batting Average is a common statistic for baseball, one that has great 
influence in fans perception of ability, but has been largely ignored in previous literature. 
Moreover, using Batting Average allows for the variables Home Runs and Stolen Bases 
to remain distinct in the analysis. Aggregating these two variables, as is done in 
Offensive Average and Total Bases, diminishes the effects of power hitters and fast base 
runners, abilities that play a very different role in the game. I also use a new aggregate 
position variable. Infield, assigned a value of one if the player’s primary position is First 
Base, Second Base, Short Stop, or Third Base.
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Table 4 lists the variable names, expected signs, and definition of the pitcher’s 
model variables. The disaggregate performance variables include. Wins, Losses, Saves, 
Complete Games, Earned Runs, Strikeouts, Walks, Hits, and Innings Pitched. These are 
the individual career totals for each category. Aggregate performance variables include 
Performance and Earned Run Average. The Performance index is the sum of complete 
games, saves, and wins minus losses. Earned Run Average is a popular fan statistic for 
measuring pitchers and represents the average number of runs given up by that pitcher in 
a 9-inning game. Using Earned Run Average also leaves Wins and Saves as independent 
variables, leading to a potential improvement in the model.
Variables relating to recognition characteristics are used in both specifications and 
include Seasons as Player, Post Season Games, and Seasons as Manager. Post Season 
Innings Pitched is also considered for pitchers. The new recognition variables included 
in this study are All-Star, Gold Gloves, Hall of Fame, and MVP for hitters or MVP/Cy 
Young for pitchers.'^ These variables are all expected to be positive, as increasing 
recognition increases the value of a baseball card. With the exception of Gold Gloves, 
these variables are binary variables, set equal to 1 if the player ever appeared in an All- 
Star game, ever won an MVP or Cy Young award, or has been elected to the Hall of 
Fame, respectively, and zero otherwise. Gold Gloves is the number of career gold gloves 
won, also an indication of superior fielding ability that is not controlled for elsewhere.
Two other variables in these models relate to the player’s tenure and card status. 
Age in 1974 is expected to be negative because older players are near the end of their 
career and productivity decreases with age. Cards issued earlier in one’s career are
Pitchers have their own separate award category Cy Young, while maintaining eligibility to win an MVP 
award.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
22
known to be valued higher than cards issued later, even though career performance is 
identical. Age is considered as a proxy for this effect. Another variable. Rookie, is a 
binary variable with a one indicating that the card is the first Topps card issued for that 
player. Consumers of baseball cards pay a premium for these cards, thus the expected 
sign for this variable is positive.
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for hitters. The average card price for 
blacks, 0.699, is considerably greater than both the price for whites, 0.374, and Hispanics, 
0.374. This, however, is consistent with mean performance variables that are also greater 
for blacks on average. The average black player hit 161 career home runs, while the 
average Hispanic player and white player hits 76 and 89, respectively. One variable 
where whites have a greater mean is in seasons as manager, 0.667 as opposed to 0.356 for 
blacks and 0.262 for Hispanics. The number of seasons as manager is determined after a 
player’s career has ended, and in many cases, those players that have become managers 
are still active managers today. Overall, the descriptive statistics presented here of 
variables that are also used in previous literature is consistent with that literature.
Of the new variables, 55.2% of black players have appeared in at least one All- 
Star game, while 50% of Hispanic, and only 35.7% of whites have had this honor. The 
distribution of the average number of Gold Gloves is fairly consistent amongst race, 
0.657; 0.690; and 0.713 for white, Hispanic, and black players respectively. Hall of 
Fame and MVP are also more favorable to blacks.
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics for pitchers. The average card price for 
pitchers are very similar across races, although still higher for blacks at 0.354; compared 
to 0.318 for Hispanics, and 0.310 for whites. Black pitchers tend to have a greater
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average number of wins. 111,but also losses, 96. White pitchers average 96 wins with 
90 losses, while Hispanic pitchers average 83 wins with 65 losses. Seasons as Manager 
reveals an interesting statistic for pitchers, which is that there are currently no black or 
Hispanic pitchers from this card set that have become a major league manager.
Moreover, pitchers as a whole do not seem to move to this level of management, even 
when white, only 0.027 years on average. The most interesting observation of these 
statistics are the relatively few black or Hispanic pitchers that existed during that time in 
Major League Baseball. Of the 210 pitchers in the sample, 183 are white, 14 are black, 
and 13 are Hispanic. This observation is similar for all other studies that used data from 
the 1960’s and 1970’s.
Of the new variables, 64.3% of blacks have appeared in an All-Stai' game, with 
only 23.1% of Hispanic players and 42.1% of white players having that same honor. 
MVP/Cy Young awards are similar, as 21.4% of the black pitchers have won the award, 
while less than 10% of Hispanics or W^hites have won. This pattern is also found in Hall 
of Fame inductees and the number of Gold Gloves. Furthermore, a Hispanic pitcher 
included in this study has never won a Gold Glove.
Empirical Results
The first of the Tobit estimates are reported in Table 7 for the disaggregate hitter’s 
model. Model 1 is the replicated Nardinelli and Simon model, which utilizes 
disaggregate performance data and is used as a baseline for the empirical specification. 
Consistent with their original study, I find a negative and statistically significant
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coefficient at the 10% level for Hispanic hitters. The coefficient for black hitters is also 
negative, but marginally insignificant at conventional levels.
McGarrity, et al. build upon this first model by adding the variable Seasons as 
Manager, replicated in Model 2. Consistent with their results, I find statistically 
insignificant coefficients for both black and Hispanics. However, I have hypothesized 
that it is also necessary to include the additional variables. All Star, Gold Glove, Hall of 
Fame, MVP, and Utility. Model 3, includes all of these variables, and regression results 
indicate the expected signs and statistical significance of these variables. With this new 
model, I continue to observe a negative sign for the coefficients for black and Hispanic 
hitters, with the coefficient for Hispanic hitters statistically significant at the 10% level 
and the coefficient for black hitters still marginally insignificant*^ Thus, this new model 
indicates that discrimination exists against Hispanic hitters, a contradiction to the findings 
of McGarrity, et al., who use the same baseball card set.
In general, within all of the disaggregate performance models, the control 
variables receive their expected signs and are significant at standard levels. The 
exceptions to this are Doubles and Triples that are expected to be positive, but are 
negative in the results. This is, however, consistent with results from McGarrity, et al. 
The other noteworthy deviation from significance and expected signs are the position 
variables, which are consistently insignificant, with the exception of Catcher and Utility. 
However, this has largely been the case throughout all of the existing baseball card 
literature.
Likelihood-ratio tests are run to determine if adding the additional variables are statistically significant 
In particular, from Model 2 to Model 3 (including walks), I calculate a chi-squared of 3S.76,with 5 degrees 
of freedom, indicating at a 1% significance level that the additional variables are not equal to zero and 
should be included.
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We now turn to the aggregate hitter’s model where Model 1 in Table 8 replicates 
the 1977 Andersen and La Croix model that uses the aggregate performance variable 
Offensive Average. Excluding the interaction variables, I find the expected signs but 
insignificant coefficients for both discrimination variables. This result is slightly 
different from Andersen and La Croix who find discrimination against blacks. **
Model 2 builds upon this model by adding the new variables, and substituting the 
aggregate Infield variable for the individual position variables. Similar to the 
disaggregate models in Table 7 ,1 find negative signs for both the black and Hispanic 
variables with Hispanic significant at the 10% level and black marginally insignificant 
Model 3 of Table 8 contains a new set of aggregate hitter’s models, using Batting 
Average instead of Offensive Average as the aggregate performance method. Tobit 
results for this model indicate negative and significant coefficients for both black and 
Hispanic, further supporting the finding that discrimination exists against hitters.*^
Here again, the new variables are all significant at standard levels, with the 
exception of Gold Glove in Model 2. Moreover, the hypothesis of using Batting Average 
to allow Home Runs and Stolen Bases to remain independent is supported in Model 3, as 
all three variables are significant at the 1% level.
The aggregate performance models improve the overall significance of the control 
variables, with two exceptions. Post Season Games is now insignificant, and the Infield
Table 14, Model 1 shows results that replicate this model including interaction terms, although no 
difference in my findings exists. Models 2 and 3 follow the aggregate models of McGarrity, et oL, with 
and without interaction terms, respectively. Consistent with their results, these models show no 
discrimination.
”  In Table 14, Model 4 1 tested an interaction between Batting Average and Race. Similar to my previous 
findings with interaction variables, no discrimination is foundL
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variable is also insignificant, but the latter is now expected, considering the results from 
the previous models.
Summarizing the hitter’s models, although the results vary based on the 
specifications used to test for discrimination, it is clear that the new variables added to 
this study improve these models. As I have shown, a set of models that are statistically 
significant for discrimination does exist over a range of methods. Thus, eliminating the 
missing variable problems of the previous literature, it appears that discrimination in the 
1974 Topps Baseball Card set exists against nonwhite hitters, most significantly Hispanic 
hitters and, marginally, black hitters.
The Tobit regressions for the disaggregate pitcher’s models are presented in Table 
9. Again, I begin with the foundation from Nardinelli and Simon in Model 1. For 
pitchers I find negative signs for both the black and Hispanic variables, with the 
coefficient for black statistically significant at the 5% level.^° This indicates a relatively 
strong presence of discrimination against black pitchers, although noting that only 14 
exist in this data set. This result for the black coefficient is in agreement with Nardinelli 
and Simon, but they also find statistical significance in their Hispanic variable.
Model 2 builds on the original model, adding a set of new variables that relate to 
star status and recognition. Here I find the same results regarding race as previously 
reported. Of the new variables in the pitcher’s model, only Seasons as Manager and 
MVP/Cy Young are statistically significant. Therefore, Winning an MVP or Cy Young 
award results in higher priced baseball cards, but appearing in an All Star game or being 
elected to the Hall of Fame are found to be irrelevant.
^  Table 15, Model 1 eliminates the variables Walks and Hits, following McGarrity, et al. This does not 
change any findings of discrimination in my sample, however, it is opposite of their findings.
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Throughout the disaggregate performance models, it is interesting that many of 
the performance variables have very little effect on price, and are generally insignificant. 
The only performance variables that do consistently affect price are Wins and Earned 
Runs, and as expected, these signs are positive and negative respectively.
Looking at the aggregate pitcher’s models. Model 3 from Table 9 modifies the 
McGarrity, et al. model by excluding the interaction variables and adding the series of 
new variables.^* The aggregation used here is the Performance index. Contrary to the 
McGarrity, et al. results, yet consistent with my findings in the disaggregate models, 1 
find that discrimination exists against black pitchers.^
In modifying the aggregation models. Model 4 uses Earned Run Average (ERA) 
as the aggregation method, where I again find statistically significant discrimination 
against black pitchers.^ Here again there is evidence that using an overall restrictive 
aggregation method is not recommended, as Wins and Saves are statistically significant 
at the 5% level in Model 4. All of the pitcher’s models are similar, in that the new 
variables are generally insignificant.
Summarizing the pitcher’s models, 1 consistently find negative coefficients for 
both black and Hispanic, with statistical significance for the black variable. This 
indicates that baseball cards of black pitchers are valued less than their equally 
productive white counterparts.
In a regression not reported here, I concur with the findings of McGarrity, et aL that the specification of 
their model finds no discrimination against pitchers in the aggregate model.
“  Table 15, Model 2 follows and concurs with the 1960-61 model of Andersen and La Croix. Modifying 
this model, shown in Table 15, Model 3 ,1 find discrimination against black pitchers, a result that is 
consistent with my other findings.
^  Table 15, Model 4 tests an interaction model using ERA as the aggregate variable. The signs on race are 
reversed, and neither variable is significant
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In a more general case, Table 10 shows the results of tests for discrimination 
against non-white hitters and non-white pitchers. I specified disaggregate performance 
models in both cases. The results in the hitter’s and pitcher’s model indicate that baseball 
cards of non-white players are valued lower thaii white players, further supporting the 
conclusion that discrimination exists in this market.
We can relate the regression coefficients from the discrimination variables to a 
percentage change in price due to discrimination, calculated as {[exp (coefficient)] -1}. 
Using the coefficient from the Not White variables in Table 10, -0.183 for hitters and — 
0.434 for pitchers, the percentage decrease in price is found to be 16.7% and 35.2%, 
respectively. Therefore, a discriminating consumer would be indifferent between a white 
hitter’s $5 card and a $4.17 non-white hitter’s card, all else constant. This relates to a 
discrimination coefficient, d, of 0.2. Equally, a discriminating consumer would be 
indifferent between a white pitcher’s $5 card and a $3.25 non-white pitcher’s card, with d 
equal to 0.54.
Throughout this chapter, I have followed the previous literature in using Beckett’s 
Baseball Card Price Guide as the source of baseball card values. Results indicate that 
previous literature is subject to missing variables. Moreover, determination of 
discrimination does vary with how the model is specified. As a whole, I have 
consistently found that discrimination exists against non-white hitters and pitchers. 
However, this does not address potential issues with the price of baseball cards that is 
used in these studies. The next chapter addresses the potential for using auction data as 
an alternative price for this market.
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AUCTIONS
Over the past few years, we have witnessed the vast growth of the Internet and e- 
commerce becoming a part of our e c o n o m y A  segment of this revolution is the large 
market for person-to-person transactions. Massive online trading communities have 
resulted, providing the opportunity for easy aecess to personal auctions.^ The most 
popular of these communities is eBay, which provides over 4 million items offered in 
over 4,300 categories. In particular, collectibles are the most common items appearing 
on eBay, with over 125,000 baseball cards offered at any single time. The ability to 
observe actual market transactions between individuals gives us a representative market 
to study potential consumer discrimination.
In developing their online auction community, eBay has given sellers significant 
control over the type of auction, the length of the auction, and the information provided. 
Sellers decide between using an ascending-price auction, Dutch auction, or private 
auction. The ascending-price auction is the most popular form of auction on eBay, and 
will be the focus of this study.
The length an auction lasts is three, five, seven, or ten days, beginning on the day 
the seller lists the item. Because eBay accepts new auctions 24 hours a day, auctions
^  For a discussion of economics and the Internet, see Borenstein and Saloner (2001).
“  For a comprehensive overview of auctions on the Internet, see Lucking-Reiley (2000a).
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begin and end at all different times. With the ending date and time known, bidders tend 
to wait until the end of an auction to reveal their bid or willingness to pay. This strategy 
is used to reduce competition among bidders, as well as to help insure successful 
bidding.^^
When listing the items, sellers determine a shipping cost, minimum bid, and 
possibly a reserve price. Shipping costs add to the buyer’s overall price paid for the item. 
Minimum bids are where the bidding will begin and are a mechanism for the seller to 
disclose the minimum they are willing to accept. Reserve prices are secret, with simply 
an indication to bidders that either the reserve price has been met, or has not been met, 
depending on the current bid price.^^
From the buyer’s perspective, the most important aspects of the auction relates to 
the information that is available about the product. In an Internet auction, the buyer is 
unable to observe the physical quality of the baseball card. Consequently, problems of 
asymmetric information could lead to the lemons problem discussed by Akerlof (1970). 
Certification and reputation can help overcome this problem, as they act as a type of 
signaling activity. Reputation is an asset in an imperfect information world, which 
results in a premium for goods sold. This premium is essentially the return on investment 
in one’s reputation (Klein and Leffler, 1981; and Shapiro, 1983).
With thousands of auctions in a similar category, the title of the auction is a few 
words that serve as a filter to attract potential bidders. The description is potentially a 
larger disclosure of information, where the seller lists as much, or as little, information as
^  It should be noted that default search results list auctions sorted by items ending first This increases the 
exposure that a particular auction receives later in the auction process. It is possible that this effect is 
picked up in the bidding process.
I do not consider the impact of reserve prices because only 2 observations existed in the sanq)le.
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they choose. The description can be thought of as a claim for the quality of the 
merchandise, assisting to overcome the previously mentioned asymmetric information 
problem. What a seller says as part of their description, or sales pitch, can sometimes 
offer an indication of what a potential bidder is looking at. Pictures also assist in this 
information process, as eBay permits pictures of items on the auction pages, thus 
improving the amount of information available to potential bidders.
Although information is useful, a buyer needs to assess how credible the seller is 
who offers this information. eBay has attempted to address the issue of reputation by 
instituting a feedback rating policy that creates an eBay user profile. Every eBay user 
starts with a zero rating, and through other users feedback is given +1 for a positive 
comment, 0 for a neutral comment, and -1 for a negative comment. This reputation 
mechanism helps buyers and sellers evaluate each other. It still remains the responsibility 
of the buyer to determine how tmstworthy a given seller is; however, feedback ratings 
offer significant additional information.^*
A series of papers by Lucking-Reiley, et al. (2000b), Bajari and Hortacsu (2CKX)), 
Houser and Wooders (2001), Resnick and Zeckhauser (2001) and Standifird (2001) have 
begun empirical analysis of eBay auctions.^
Bajari and Hortacsu (2000) examine 1998 eBay coin auctions looking at the 
reserve prices and entry determinants. They find that high minimum bids reduced the
^  When eBay originally began operations, they allowed any user to give feedback to any other user, thus 
creating instances where friends could assist friend’s ratings, and losing bidders could hinder seller’s 
ratings. In March 2000, eBay changed this policy to only allow feedback by parties involved in a 
transaction. Thus only a winning bidder can offer feedback for a seller, and only the seller can give 
feedback for the buyer. It is also important to understand that a buyer’s feedback and a seller’s feedback is 
not exclusive. When viewing a users feedback rating, it includes both buying and selling activity. This 
then becomes a reputation rating as opposed to a buyers rating or sellers rating.
^  In a purely theoretical study, Budish and Takeyama (2001) study the use of setting maximum bid levels 
in Internet auctions.
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number of bidders, while higher book values of these coins increased the number of 
bidders. They also find that bidding activity increased significantly toward the end of an 
auction. In a similar study on coin auctions, Lucking-Reiley, et al. (2000b) look at the 
determination of price of 461 coin auctions in 1999. They find that reserve prices and 
minimum bids have a positive effect on auction prices, although these mechanisms tend 
to cause few if any bidders. They also find that longer auctions result in higher prices. 
For reputation, only negative feedback is significant resulting in the expected decrease in 
auction price. Positive feedback yields a greater price, however, this result is not 
statistically significant.
Resnick and Zeckhauser (2001) focus on the reputation system of eBay, 
developing a comprehensive analysis of reputations and eBay feedback. Using a data set 
of 456 identical Rio MP3 players and then 180 identical Britannia Beanie Babies from 
1999 eBay auctions, they find that negative feedback has a greater negative impact on 
price than does the positive impact created by positive feedback. Houser and Wooders 
(2001) agree with this finding, after studying Pentium HI 500 MHz processors during the 
fall of 1999. These findings indicate that negative feedback is significantly more 
important and detrimental to price and bidding behavior. Interestingly, Resnick and 
Zeckhauser (2001) find that negative and neutral feedback is not very common. One 
explanation for this is that eBay does not require feedback from its users, thus a buyer, 
seller, or both may decide not to rate a given transaction. This is essentially lost 
information because it is unknown exactly how many transactions a particular user 
participated in relative to their feedback ratings.
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Strandifird (20001) focuses on the reputation aspect of eBay in a study of 102 
new Palm Pilot auctions in January 2000. These findings indicate negative and 
statistically significant coefficients for negative ratings, but insignificant coefficients for 
the majority of the positive ratings. The only statistically significant positive rating is in 
a sub-sample of auctions where only sellers with a feedback rating of at least 10 are 
included.
In the next chapter I develop a model to use with the auction data, describe these 
data, and present the empirical results.
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CHAPTER 6 
MODEL, DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Model
The model used with the auction data is developed with the same methodology as 
the previously specified hedonic method. Building upon the original specification, it is 
possible to describe baseball cards sold through auction, BCa, as a vector of 
characteristics, Za, which contains demographic, performance, recognition, card, auction, 
and seller characteristics. The vector of card characteristics now also includes the quality 
of the card, determined through certification and an element of the description claim.
The auction characteristics include variables that define the auction setup, such as the 
number of days listed, and ending time. The seller characteristics include reputation and 
the sales pitch offered via the description claim.
I estimate:
(10) E[Pgca] =P'Zi + Y Si + ÔDi + e,-
where Z is a vector of player performance, recognition, demographic, card, and auction 
characteristics, excluding race, with ̂  being the corresponding vector of coefficients. 5 is 
the vector of seller characteristics, with coefficient y, that only affect a bidders bid and 
not the seller’s minimum bid. D remains as the dummy variable that is set equal to one if
34
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the player is a minority with coefficient <5. e is a random disturbance term and i indexes 
observations. The test for discrimination also remains the same, <5^0.
The empirical model uses the auction price as the dependent variable. This price 
is the total amount paid to the seller, and is defined as the natural logarithm of the final 
bid plus shipping costs. Because only 60% of the auctions included in this study received 
at least one bid, there are auction prices that are censored at the minimum bid plus 
shipping costs. Therefore, the actual market price is not always observed because the 
minimum bid amount is set too high. To account for this variation, I follow Lucking- 
Reiley, et al. (2000) in using the censored-normal maximum-likelihood estimation. This 
estimation method is exactly the same as the Tobit method used previously, except that 
the minimum bid plus shipping cost is the censoring point, which is different for each 
observation. Auctions that do not receive a bid are left censored at the minimum bid 
because a market transaction does not take place. Auctions that receive a bid are not 
censored because the market price is revealed through the bidding process.
My empirical strategy is to replicate the aggregate performance model presented 
in Chapter 4, using 1974 baseball cards and 2001 auction prices. In addition, I examine 
the effects the various auction mechanisms have on the total price of baseball cards.
Data
As a result of the potential biases in price guide pricing, previously discussed, it 
makes sense to consider data from alternative prices. A previously unavailable large 
market where transactions are observable now exists with Internet auctions. Internet sites 
like eBay create a relatively easy environment for sellers to find large groups of bidders
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on short notice. With search engines and categorized listings, finding items to bid on 
becomes even easier for buyers. With trading cards consisting of a large portion of 
collectible listings, online auctions have become an active market with lots of 
participants, thus an excellent source of an alternative market price for baseball cards.
The data being used for this study comes from 118 eBay auctions of 1974 Topps 
baseball cards during the period of February 12 through February 20,2001.*° To obtain 
this data, I first visited the eBay website category “Sports > Trading Cards> Baseball; 
MLB.” From here I used the keyword ‘Topps 1974 -(sets, set, packs, pack, lots, lot)” in 
the search option to search titles and descriptions within this category. This search limits 
the results to only 1974 Topps baseball cards, immediately eliminating any reference to 
complete sets, packs, or lots of cards. Since the interest of this study is on individual 
cards, it is necessary to eliminate these types of auctions. After eliminating these types of 
auctions through the search facility, I manually sort through the results choosing only 
those auctions that are in fact single 1974 Topps baseball cards. This procedure was done 
during the last two days that the auction was active because some of the information 
included, such as feedback ratings, is only accurately available to bidders prior to the 
close of the auction.
Another reason for this collection time is to ensure the inclusion of new three-day 
auctions that could have begun at the time of data collection, thus all relevant auctions 
that ended during the 9 day time period are included. During the time that the auctions 
were active, all necessary pages were saved because eBay only maintains auction pages 
on their server for approximately 30 days. After the auctions closed, these pages were
“  From the original 134 auctions obtained, 14 observations are lost because of missing shipping 
information, and 2 observations are dropped because of the use of reserve prices.
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saved again. This ensures that all information is accurate at the appropriate time. The 
timing of data collection is important because a seller’s reputation only affects a buyer’s 
decision during the open auction. After the auction closes, this information can change 
from new feedback because ratings are updated in real time, thus later feedback does not 
accurately reflect the impact on bidding.
Table 11 lists the new auction variable names, expected signs, and descriptions. 
The dependent variable used for the censored-normal regressions. Full Price, is the full 
auction price. This is the natural log of the final bid plus the shipping costs. Shipping 
costs vary by auction, but are believed to be calculated into a buyer’s willingness to pay 
and thus, their bid price. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider the auction price as the 
actual dollar amount paid for the baseball card to the seller.
The variables. Positive and Negative are representative of the reputation system of 
eBay. Following the existing literature, the reputation variables are the natural log of its 
unique rating plus one.** A unique positive rating is the total number unique users that 
gave positive feedback. A unique negative rating is the total number of unique users that 
gave negative feedback. Using a unique rating eliminates some of the previous inflation 
from non-transaction feedback, because only one feedback per eBay user is included.
The unique value is also more meaningful than the overall feedback because it is the 
value used to calculate the users final rating that is visible on the initial auction screen.
We can also interpret the results in terms of a percentage change in reputation, both 
positive and negative.
Three indications of card quality are used in this study. The first is the variable 
Certified, to indicate if a baseball card expert has independently certified the card. Once
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a card is certified, it is enclosed in a sealed protective case, providing good quality 
information in an otherwise imperfect information setting.
The second indicator of card quality is a set of description claims. Claim Low, 
Claim Med, and Claim High. These variables are determined by the card quality 
described in the auction description. In cases of certified cards, this claim is the certified 
quality. In cases of non-certified cards, it is the seller’s personal opinion of the quality. 
Claim High is assigned a one if the card is described as near mint or near mint-mint, and 
zero otherwise. Claim Med is assigned a one if the card is described as excellent or 
excellent-mint, and zero otherwise. Claim Low is used as the base case, and is assigned a 
one for all claims not already considered, and zero otherwise. It is expected that the 
medium and high claims will be positive, relative to a low claim as better quality cards 
are worth more.
The third quality indicator is a picture. If a picture is present with the auction it is 
assigned a value of one, and zero otherwise. Pictures of any quality are expected to 
increase the infonnation available for the auction and thus increase the price.
Other variables related to the auction mechanism are the length of the auction 
listing, with dummy variables to represent Three, Five, Seven, and Ten-day auctions.
Also the variable Weekend is a dummy variable to indicate if the auction ended on a 
Saturday or Sunday.
The final variable added for the auction models is the Winfield variable; a binary 
variable assigned a one if the card is of Dave Winfield. A Dave Winfield card is 
controlled for because of the timing of these auctions. Shortly before this auction period 
it was announced that Winfield was elected to the Hall of Fame. Thus, his card is very
Rating plus one is used to eliminate undefined natural logarithms from zero ratings.
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popular during this auction period and could have some immediate fluctuation in price 
while it reaches a new equilibrium with this new information.**
In addition to these new auction variables, many of the variables used in the 
previous models are again used in the auction models with the exception of the pitcher 
specific variables. The data used for the auctions are only for hitters because of the lack 
of auctions and variation of pitcher’s cards offered at auction during this time period. 
Therefore, the auction model builds upon the hitter’s model from Tables 3 ,5 ,7 , and 8. 
The definitions and expected signs of these variables are the same as previously 
discussed.
The descriptive statistics of the variables used for the auction models are listed in 
Table 12. The first column lists all races, followed by statistics for black players only, 
Hispanic players only, and than white players only. Similar to the statistics of the full set 
using Beckett prices, the mean price of black players cards, 2.125, is higher than white 
(1.785) or Hispanic (1.421) players card. The performance variables indicate a higher 
mean batting average for Hispanic players at 0.292, while the average black players 
batting average is 0.285, and the average white player’s batting average is 0.267. The 
other performance variables indicate higher mean values for black players.
Some other interesting observations come from these statistics regarding the 
sample of players offered at auction. There are no white or Hispanic rookie cards 
offered, even though 23 exist in the full set. Under Beckett’s categorization of baseball 
card values, only 1 common card that happens to be of a white player is auctioned. This 
might be an indication that the Beckett book value is influential on a seller’s expected
Recognizing the potential bias created with the large number of Winfield cards and the inclusion of a 
Winfield variable, I ran regressions without these observations. The results of these are essentially the
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return. It is also quite clear that star players are dominant in this group, as 98.3% have 
appeared in at least 1 all-star game compared to 42.6% from the entire set. It is necessary 
to drop this variable from the regressions because of the lack of variation. Other 
recognition variables. Hall of Fame, Gold Gloves, and MVP are also more prevalent in 
the auction sample. Of this sample, 67.2% are in the Hall of Fame, 49.2% have won at 
least one MVP award, and the average number of Gold Gloves is just under 4, although it 
appears that white players win more gold gloves (4.6) compared to black players (3.4) or 
Hispanic players (1.6).
As for the auction specific variables, little variation of the mean exists on Positive 
feedback between races. However, a user with negative feedback never brings Hispanic 
cards to auction. Moreover, 85.7% of Hispanic cards have a high description claim, 
which is considerably more than other races. There exists no obvious explanation for 
these differences in Hispanic cards, other then the fact that very few are even offered for 
auction in the first place. Regarding certification, 10.2% of the cards included in the 
study are certified. Considering the low, if any, cost involved in scanning a picture for 
auction viewing, it is not surprising that 82% of the auctions contained at least one 
picture of the card.
As for the length of time a card is offered, 75% of the auctions last for 7 days.
This is not surprising because 7 days is the longest possible offering without incurring 
additional listing fees.** Almost half, 45% of the auctions ended on Saturday or Sunday, 
which is an indication of increased competition during the weekend in this well organized 
market. Although the descriptive statistics reveal some oddities in the auction sample, it
same as the results presented.
10-day auctions require an additional listing fee.
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is worthwhile to move forward recognizing that the data were collected over a 9-day 
period of actual market transactions.
Empirical Results
The censored normal regression results are reported in Table 13, using Not White 
as the discrimination variable in Model 1 and black and Hispanic individually in Model 
2. Both of these models use the aggregate performance variable. Batting Average, along 
with the aggregate positional variable. Infield. The coefficients on the discrimination 
variables are negative and statistically significant at standard levels. Of the performance 
variables. Batting Average and Home Runs influence the willingness to pay, while stolen 
bases is not statistically different from zero. As for the auction variables, it appears that 
reputation is insignificant, as both the positive and negative ratings have no effect on 
price. However, as expected, certification is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level. A high description claim also increases price, as does a Dave Winfield card.
The regression results of these two models indicate that a large number of 
variables are not influential on the final auction price. In particular, reputation does not 
influence price, which is contradictory to the theory that says a premium should be found 
for a good quality reputation. One possible explanation for this is the variation amongst 
the quality of the product, something I attempted to control for with certification and 
description claims.
Another point worth noting is the largely insignificant impact of the new variables 
that are significantly important in determining the book value of baseball cards. With the 
exception of batting average, the remaining new variables are statistically insignificant.
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One explanation for the insignificant variables is because all but one card is of players of 
star status, thus little variation exists in a player’s ability to affect price.^
Similar to the interpretation of the regression coefficients from the discrimination 
variables presented in Chapter 4 ,1 again determine the percentage change in price due to 
discrimination in this market. Using the coefficient from Model 1 of Table 13, -0.622, 
the percentage decrease in price is found to be 46.3%. Therefore, a discriminating 
consumer would be indifferent between a white player’s $5 card and a $2.69 card of a 
non-white player, all else constant. This relates to a discrimination coefficient, d, of 0.86. 
This is a larger impact on price than previously found with the price guide prices.
In summary, the auction results yield some important consideration regarding 
consumer discrimination, reputation, and certification issues. Most importantly, these 
results indicate that future research is warranted in this area. The ideas that I have 
presented with the auction models can be built upon in ways that can lead to a greater 
understanding of the auction mechanisms that drive bidding behavior. In spite of the 
issues with auctions, the use of auction data, that uses actual market transactions as an 
alternative price, finds that consumer discrimination is present in the baseball card market 
for hitters. In terms of non-white players, this result is consistent with the Beckett’s Price 
Guide prices. However, the results of the aggregate auction model are indicators of an 
increased discrimination when compared to price guide models.
^  A second explanation looks at the buyer of the baseball card. With the purpose of bidding unknown, it is 
possible that a buyer may have the intention of reselling cards at card shows or within a local team market 
that could result in higher resale value. Moreover, with the intent to resell the item, a buyer is willing to 
pay less then a collector who is not looking to cam a profit
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CONCLUSION
This study focuses on the issue of consumer discrimination in the market for 
baseball cards. Utilizing the hedonic price model, I first follow previous literature in 
exploring the effects of race using prices from Beckett’s Baseball Card Price Guide. I 
then consider the use of the eBay auction market as actual transactions and an improved 
data source for testing the presence of consumer discrimination. Within the auction 
framework it is also necessary to briefly consider issues of certification and reputation.
I find the existing discrimination literature is subject to missing variables. Adding 
in new variables that control for more of a player’s performance and other characteristics, 
result in a finding that discrimination exists against non-white baseball players.
Using auction data, I find the result of consumer discrimination in the baseball 
card market. I have attempted to control for some of the issues within auctions, such as 
reputation and certification, as well as the variation in quality of the card; however, given 
these issues and the size of my data set, these results should be viewed with caution and 
additional work in this area should be preformed.
While the findings of consumer discrimination are significant in their own 
respect, these results do not necessarily capture the entire market. Without identifying 
the buyers, it is possible that older generations account for the majority of these market 
transactions. Therefore, it is possible that older generations have a greater taste for
43
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discrimination than the younger generations. If this is the case, a future study of current 
baseball cards would show that discrimination has been reduced, assuming younger 
generations account for the majority of the market transactions. However, one must be 
cautious in studying active players as the problem of speculation of a player’s ability 
remains.
Other considerations for future research include replication of this study using 
various years of price guide data. Although I do not recommend the price guide data as a 
primary source for market prices, it is possible to use this information to measure 
discrimination over time. Regardless of the price used, it is also necessary to recognize 
the subjective method used to determine a player’s race. Ideally, future research would 
find a method to obtain actual race disclosures of baseball players, however, this 
information does not exist at this time. In that case, I agree with the ideas presented by 
Fort and Gill (2000) that a continuous measure of race is possible. This measure allows 
for consideration of black Hispanic players, as opposed to the discrete black or Hispanic.
Overall it is worth considering the use of an alternative market for prices of 
baseball cards. The distribution of the prices from the Beckett Baseball Card Price Guide 
is a generalization into broad categories of abilities. Actual market transactions account 
for a greater variation in price, which is expected considering the different characteristics 
found amongst players. Furthermore, market transactions reveal that some cards, such as 
common cards, have become relatively worthless. Auction data appears to be the easiest 
observable market for this type of study.
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Table 1. Review of the Literature
Nardinelli & 
Simon (1990)
Gabriel, Johnson, 
& Stanton (1995)
McGarrity, 
Palmer, & Poitras 
(1999)
Card Yeaifs) 1970 1984-1990 1974
Price Year 19159 1992 1994
Sign Sig. Sign Sig. Sign Sig.
Hitters
Black - - -
Hispanic - *** - -
Pitchers
Black - ** - -
Hispanic - * + - ***
Aggregate Models
Andersen & 
La Croix (1991)
Andersen & 
La Croix (1991)
McGarrity, 
Palmer, & Poitras 
(1999)
Card Yearfs) 1960-61 1977 1974
Price Year 1982 1985 1994
Sign Sig. Sign Sig. Sign Sig.
Hitters
Black - - *** -
Hispanic + - 4-
Pitchers
Black - + ** +
Hispanic - - -
Note; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (two-tailed t-tests)
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Table 2. Frequency Distribution of 2000-2001 Beckett Prices
Card Classification Price All Races Black(%) Hispanic (%) White (%)
Common 0.50 364 53 14.6 38 10.4 273 75.0
Minor Stars 1 105 25 23.8 8 7.6 72 68.6
Semi-Stars 2 42 11 26.2 5 11.9 26 61.9
Unlisted Starŝ ^ 3 11 2 18.2 3 27.3 6 54.5
4 4 1 1 2
6 8 4 0 4
8 3 1 0 2
Stars^ 10 2 1 41.7 0 4.2 1 54.215 3 1 0 2
30 1 0 0 1
35 1 1 0 0
40 2 1 0 1
Observations 546 101 18.5 55 10.1 390 71.4
Note: % is the percentage of each classification for that given race.
“Unlisted Stars” are those players that are worth more than “Semi-Stars”, yet not listed in the Monthly 
Price Guide.
^  “Stars” are those players that are listed individually in the Monthly Price Guide.
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Table 3. Definitions of Variables :or Hitters Models
Variable Name ExpectedSign Definition
Card Price N/A Dependent Variable -  Card Price is the log price minus the log price of the common card.
Not Common N/A Dummy variable = 1 if card price > 0.50
Black ? Dummy variable = 1 if player is black
Hispanic ? Dummy variable = 1 if player is Hispanic
Not White ? Dummy variable = 1 if player is black or Hispanic
Rookie + Dummy variable = 1 if rookie card
Hits -1- Career number of hits
Doubles + Career number of doubles
Triples + Career number of triples
Home Runs + Career number of home runs
Walks -1- Career number of walks
At Bats - Career number of at bats
Stolen Bases + Career number of stolen bases
Seasons as Player - Number of years as a Major League player
Post Season G + Career number of post season games
Seasons as Mgr 4- Number of years as a Major League manager
All-Star 4- Dummy variable = 1 if player ever on an All-Star team
Gold Gloves 4- Career number of gold gloves won
Hall of Fame 4- Dummy variable = 1 if player ever inducted in Hall of Fame
MVP 4- Dummy variable = 1 if player ever awarded Most Valuable Player
First Base - Dummy variable = 1 if most career games at first base
Second Base 4- Dummy variable = 1 if most career games at second base
Short Stop 4- Dummy variable = 1 if most career games at short stop
Third Base 4- Dummy variable = 1 if most career games at third base
Outfield Omitted Dummy variable = 1 if most career games at outfield
Catcher 4- Dummy variable = 1 if most career games at catcher
Utility - Dummy variable = 1 if played a significant number of games at a second position relative to main position
Infield 4- Dummy variable = 1 if played first, second, short, or third
Total Bases 4- (total bases gained on hits + walks 4- stolen bases)
Offensive Average 4- (total bases gained on hits 4-  walks 4-  stolen bases)/(at bats 4-  walks)
Batting Average 4- Career batting average (calculated as hits/at bats)
Runs 4- Career number of runs scored
RBI 4- Career number of runs batted in
Age in 1974 - Age of player when card was issued in 1974
League - Dummy variable = 1 if player played 10% of the time in a second league
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Table 4. Definitions of Variables or Pitchers Models
Variable Name ExpectedSign Definition
Card Price N/A Dependent Variable -  Card Price is the log price minus the log price of the common card.
Not Common N/A Dummy variable = 1 if card price > 0.50
Black ? Dummy variable = 1 if player is black
Hispanic ? Dummy variable = 1 if player is Hispanic
Not White ? Dummy variable = 1 if player is black or Hispanic
Rookie + Dummy variable = 1 if rookie card
Wins + Career number of wins
Losses - Career number of losses
Saves + Career number of saves
Complete Games + Career number of complete games
Earned Runs - Career number of earned runs
Strikeouts + Career number of strikeouts
Walks - Career number of walks
Hits - Career number of hits allowed
Innings Pitched ? Career number of innings pitched
Post Season IP + Career number of post season innings pitched
Post Season G + Career number of post season games played
Hall of Fame + Dummy variable = 1 if player ever inducted in Hall of Fame
Seasons as Player - Number of years as a Major League player
Seasons as Mgr + Number of years as a Major League manager
All Star + Dummy variable = 1 if player ever on an All-Star team
MVP/Cy Young + Dummy variable = 1 if player ever awarded MVP or Cy Young
Gold Glove + Career number of gold gloves won
Earned Run Average - Career earned run average (calculated as (Earned Runs*9)/IP)
Performance + Sum of complete games, saves, and wins minus losses
Age in 1974 - Age of player when card was issued in 1974
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of Varia jles for Hitters Mocels
All Races Blac Hispanic White
Mean Std.Dev. Mean
Std.
Dev. Mean
Std.
Dev. Mean
Std.
Dev.
Card Price 0.458 0.769 0.699 0.971 0.374 0.598 0.374 0.681
Not Common 0.378 0.517 0.333 0.329
Rookie 0.083 0.057 0.048 0.101
Not White 0.384 1.000 1.000 0.000
Black 0.259 1.000 0.000 0.000
Hispanic 0.125 0.000 1.000 0.000
Hits 1062.4 796.33 1402.55 844.27 1200.02 796.49 891.5 724.81
Doubles 171.76 138.80 230.25 151.12 190.67 138.86 143.35 125.02
Triples 27.5 25.079 40.46 30.64 34.214 25.812 20.69 19.27
Home Runs 106.21 124.67 160.78 150.19 75.88 90.91 89.43 111.74
Walks 407.81 351.65 528.91 377.99 320.45 245.18 374.63 347.32
At Bats 4018.3 2804.9 5098.3 2849.6 4439.8 2802.1 3478.9 2649.6
Stolen Bases 73.03 115.50 139.84 157.09 115.93 155.0 36.25 54.70
Seasons as Player 12.62 4.83 13.71 4.51 12.83 4.97 12.12 4.87
Post Season G 10.69 13.64 13.75 15.39 10.14 12.07 9.51 13.02
Seasons as Mgr 0.536 2.263 0.356 1.67 0.262 1.39 0.667 2.594
All Star 0.426 0.552 0.50 0.357
Gold Gloves 0.676 1.924 0.713 1.855 0.690 1.81 0.657 0.392
Hall of Fame 0.054 0.103 0.071 0.029
MVP 0.063 0.115 0.023 0.048
First Base 0.122 0.126 0.095 0.126
Second Base 0.119 0.103 0.190 0.111
Short Stop 0.125 0.115 0.214 0.155
Third Base 0.089 0.034 0.048 0.121
Outfield 0.384 0.701 0.381 0.251
Catcher 0.161 0.023 0.071 0.237
Utility 0.289 0.241 0.262 0.314
Infield 0.455 0.276 0.548 0.512
Total Bases 2088.6 1669.1 2864.8 1832.9 2123.1 1525.0 1755.4 1516.2
Offensive .Average 0.497 0.084 0.553 0.069 0.469 0.077 0.479 0.080
Batting Average 0.252 0.027 0.267 0.021 0.259 0.027 0.244 0.026
Runs 515.59 415.83 724.80 461.57 545.10 384.12 421.67 367.90
RBI 496.41 434.33 676.87 490.74 474.90 382.46 424.93 397.67
Age in 1974 28.72 3.80 28.94 3.80 29.45 4.76 28.49 3.57
League 0.515 0.563 0.476 0.502
N (Common/Total) 209/336 42/87 28/42 139/2(37
Note: Standard Deviations are not reported for binary variables.
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of Variables for Pitchers Models
All Races Blac c Hispanic White
Mean Std.Dev. Mean
Std.
Dev. Mean
Std.
Dev. Mean
Std.
Dev.
Card Price 0.314 0.659 0.354 0.788 0.318 0.668 0.310 0.652
Not Common 0.262 0.214 0.231 0.268
Rookie 0.090 0.071 0.154 0.087
Not White 0.129 1.000 1.000 0.000
Black 0.067 1.000 0.000 0.000
Hispanic 0.062 0.000 1.000 0.000
Wins 96.39 76.06 111.14 84.47 83.38 81.84 96.18 75.25
Losses 89.10 60.71 95.71 59.96 64.54 56.11 90.34 60.99
Saves 31.35 51.82 14.64 24.36 35.46 27.99 32.34 54.46
Complete Games 53.01 63.46 74.57 88.19 52.54 86.63 51.46 59.46
Earned Runs 637.39 443.01 699.71 436.42 494.31 411.81 642.78 445.87
Strikeouts 996.22 840.91 1263.21 956.77 84.46 811.23 986.72 834.26
Walks 560.25 386.92 674.71 349.84 423.85 325.57 561.18 392.23
Hits 1551.31 1115.9 1671.57 1122.1 1225.15 1065.9 1565.28 1120.8
Innings Pitched 1642.85 1207.8 1861.43 1267.0 1337.94 1195.9 1647.79 1206.5
Post Season IP 14.83 24.04 21.33 25.92 14.45 23.78 14.36 23.98
Post Season G 4.162 5.541 5.571 5.996 4.692 5.779 4.016 5.504
Hall of Fame 0.571 0.143 0.077 0.049
Seasons as Player 12.01 5.10 12.71 4.23 11.31 4.37 12.01 5.22
Seasons as Mgr 0.024 0.284 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.027 0.304
All Star 0.424 0.643 0.231 0.421
MVP/Cy Young 0.071 0.214 0.077 0.060
Gold Glove 0.186 1.348 0.643 2.405 0.00 0.00 0.164 1.286
Earned Run Avg. 3.597 0.461 3.511 0.452 3.479 0.595 3.612 0.452
Performance 91.70 85.09 104.64 110.34 106.85 105.90 89.64 81.69
Age in 1974 28.99 3.93 29.21 3.79 31.31 5.86 28.81 3.75
N (Common/Total) 155/2 10 11/14 10/13 134/11S3
Note: Standard Deviations are not reported for binary variables.
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Table 7. Tobit Regressions for Disaggregate Hitters Models
Mode 1 Mode 2 Model 3^
Coef. T-Stat Coef. T-Stat Coef. T-Stat
Black -0.194 1.544 -0.181 1.439 -0.147 1.345
Hispanic -0.263* 1.664 -0.234 1.476 -0.252* 1.852
Hits 0.002*** 3.720 0.002*** 3.314 0.002*** 2.717
Doubles -0.003** 2.086 -0.003** 2.099 -0.002* 1.831
Triples -0.002 0.731 -0.002 0.626 -0.002 0.622
Home Runs 0.004*** 6.310 0.004*** 6.219 0.003*** 5.435
Walks 1.14E-'’ 0.045 2.72E'^ 0.108
At Bats -3.15E-̂ ** 1.946 -2.55E-̂ 1.544 -2.66E^* 1.674
Stolen Bases 0.001*** 2.840 0.001*** 2.929 0.001*** 2.634
Seasons Player 0.016 0.703 0.013 0.579 0.029 1.427
Post Season G 0.011*** 3.131 0.011*** 3.129 0.006** 1.937
Seasons as Mgr 0.029* 1.837 0.029** 2.067
All Star 0.422*** 3.718
Gold Gloves 0.047** 2.371
Hall of Fame 0.497*** 2.596
MVP 0.281* 1.667
Rookie 0.536*** 2.946 0.561*** 3.078 0.546*** 3.474
First Base -0.161 1.101 -0.129 0.883 -0.087 0.656
Second Base 0.021 0.117 -0.016 0.088 -0.058 0.360
Short Stop 0.382** 2.119 0.311* 1.669 0.218 1.268
Third Base -0.103 0578 -0.104 0.588 -0.071 0.454
Catcher 0.488*** 3.347 0.472*** 3.232 0.264** 2.016
Utility -0.172* 1.631
Constant -1.620*** 6.732 -1.620*** 6.739 -1.346*** 6.334
Log-Likelihood -168.976 -167.277 -149.396
LR Statistic 389.97*** 393.37*** 429.13***
N (Common/Total) 209/336 209/336 209/336
Note: Dependent variable. Card Price, is the difference between the natural logarithm of the 
player’s card price and the common card price.
The absolute value of the t-statistic is reported.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01(two-tailed t-tests)
^ Model 3 is reduced from an original model that included the variables, RBI, Runs, Age in 1974, and 
Walks. All of these variables were insignificant and likelihood-ratio tests indicated it is acceptable to drop 
these variables. Removing these variables does not alter the sign or statistical significance of the 
coefficients for either the black or Hispanic variables.
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Mode 1 Model 2^ Mode 3
Coef. T-Stat Coef. T-Stat Coef. T-Stat
Black -0.138 1.086 -0.161 1.547 -0.211* 1.915
Hispanic -0.220 1.312 -0.240* 1.781 -0.308** 2.196
Home Runs 0.003*** 6.842
At Bats 0.0003*** 10.696 1.92E"**** 6.802
Stolen Bases 0.001*** 3.859
Offensive Average 7.454*** 6.129 4.381*** 4.522
Batting Average 8.043*** 3.269
Seasons Player 0.036** 2.326
Post Season G 0.010*** 2.524 0.005 1.718 0.005 1.509
Seasons as Mgr 0.038** 2.190 0.038*** 2.725 0.034** 2.488
All Star 0.439*** 2.725 0.466*** 4.225
Gold Gloves 0.024 1.254 0.043** 2.382
Hall of Fame 0.781*** 4.200 0.595*** 3.155
MVP 0.426*** 2.586 0.307* 1.859
Rookie 0.740*** 3.370 0.590*** 3.494 0.603*** 3.733
First Base -0.105 0.678
Second Base -0.037 0.191
Short Stop 0.347* 1.682
Third Base -0.134 0.718
Catcher 0.588*** 3.515 0.280** 2.033 0.299** 2.198
Utility -0.229** 2.074 -0.230** 2.138
Infield -0.039 0.391 0.067 0.688
Age in 1974 0.020 1.492
League -0.091 0.896
Constant -5.544*** 8.166 -3.123*** 6.905 -3.346*** 5.305
Log-Likelihood -174.433 -154.975 -151.128
LR Statistic 379.05*** 417.97*** 425.66***
N (Common/Total) 209/336 209/336 209/336
Note: Dependent variable. Card Price, is the difference between the natural logarithm oi 
player’s card price and the common card price.
The absolute value of the t-statistic is reported.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (two-tailed t-tests)
the
38 Dropping the variables. Age in 1974 and League have no affect on the results.
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Table 9. Tobit Regressions for Pitchers Models
Model 1 
Disaggregate
Model 2 
Disaggregate
Model 3 
Aggregate
Model 4 
Aggregate
Coef. T-Stat Coef. T-Stat Coef. T-Stat Coef. T-Stat
Black -0.567** 2.090 -0.662*** 2.673 -0.756*** 2.479 -0.625* 1.819
Hispanic -0.454 1.440 -0.101 0.395 -0.305 1.064 -0.389 1.040
Wins 0.024*** 3.405 0.026*** 4.086 0.020** 2.449
Losses -5.48E-̂ 0.084 0.006 1.073
Saves 0.004*** 2.744 0.001 0.664 0.003** 2.133
Complete Games 0.004 1.297 0.003 1.149 0.003 0.764
Earned Runs -0.002* 1.641 -0.004*** 3.093 -0.002 1.582
Strikeouts 1.84E"' 0.650 1.98E^ 0.849 6.69E"**** 3.784
Walks 7.7 lE-̂ 1.512 7.87E^ 1.735
Hits A.lTEf 0.626 -5.8 IE"" 0.086
Innings Pitched 4.99E"̂ 0.049 -5.68E-^ 0.640 4.75E^ 1.034 -7.38E^ 1.498
Performance 0.005*** 3.364
Earned Run 
Average -0.518** 2.088
Post Season IP 0.004 1.382 2.38E-^ 0.107 0.006*** 2.624 0.005 1.555
Seasons as Player 0.032 0.892
Seasons as Mgr 0.260** 2.343 0.335** 2.396 0.366** 2.265
All Star 0.179 1.268 0.173 1.037 0.179 0.918
Hall of Fame 0.143 0.554 -0.118 0.388 0.385 1.172
MVP/Cy Young 0.398** 2.339 0.433** 2.103 0.314 1.313
Gold Glove 0.037 1.432 0.020 0.649 -0.001 0.027
Rookie 0.503** 2.323 0.179 0.922 0.509** 2.291 0.689*** 2.561
Age in 1974 -0.071*** 4.749
Constant -1.436*** 7.049 0.644 1.462 -1.437*** 6.788 0.109 0.123
Log-Likelihood -76.123 -59.3113 -77.1113 -82.872
LR Statistic 210.92*** 244.54*** 208.94*** 197.43***
N (Common/Total) 155/210 155/210 155/210 155/210
Note: Dependent variable. Card Price, is the difference between the natural logarithm of the 
player’s card price and the common card price.
The absolute value of the t-statistic is reported.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01(two-tailed t-tests)
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Table 10. Non-White Regressions
Hitters N(odel Pitchers Model
Coef. T-Stat Coef. T-Stat
Not White -0.183* 1.885 Not White -0.434** 2.242
Hits 0.002*** 2.692 Wins 0.027*** 4.238
Doubles -0.002* 1.829 Losses 0.005 0.881
Triples -0.002 0.527 Saves 0.001 0.832
Home Runs 0.003*** 5.733 Complete Games 0.004 1.437
At Bats -2.64E"‘* 1.665 Earned Runs -0.004*** 2.952
Stolen Bases 0.001*** 2.666 Strikeouts 1.63E^ 0.685
Seasons Player 0.272 1.357 Walks 7.63E^* 1.647
Post Season G 0.006** 2.003 Hits -1.37E^ 0.199
Seasons as Mgr 0.029** 2.090 Innings Pitched -5.61E^ 0.62
All Star 0.418*** 3.688 Post Season IP 2.89E^ 0.127
Gold Gloves 0.046** 2.357 Seasons as Player 0.035 0.985
Hall of Fame 0.482*** 2.525 Seasons as Mgr 0.261** 2.292
MVP 0.287* 1.704 All Star 0.156 1.085
Rookie 0.547*** 3.482 Hall of Fame 0.084 0.321
First Base -0.088 0.664 MVP/Cy Young 0.342** 2.018
Second Base -0.070 0.433 Gold Glove 0.027 1.062
Short Stop 0.205 1.199 Rookie 0.234 1.186
Third Base -0.077 0.493 Age in 1974 -0.069*** 4.524
Catcher 0.257** 1.966
Utility -0.174* 1.645
Constant -1.328*** 6.309 Constant 0.517 1.166
Log-Likelihood -149.677 Log-Likelihood -60.778
LR Statistic 428.57*** LR Statistic 241.61***
N (Common/Total) 209/336 N (Common/Total) 155/210
Note: Dependent variable. Card Price, is the difference between the natural 
player’s card price and the conunon card price.
The absolute value of the t-statistic is reported.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (two-tailed t-tests)
ogarithm of the
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Table 11. Definitions of Variables for Auction Models
Variable Name ExpectedSign Definition
Full Price N/A Dependent Variable -  Natural log of final bid plus shipping cost
Bid N/A Dummy variable = 1 if at least 1 bid is placed on the auction
Positive + Natural log of (Positive ratings + 1)
Negative - Natural log of (Negative ratings + 1)
Certified + Dummy variable = 1 if card is independently certified
Claim Low Omitted Dummy variable = 1 if description claims card quality is Poor, Fair, Good, or Very Good
Claim Med + Dummy variable = 1 if description claims card quality is Excellent or Excellent-Mint
Claim High + Dummy variable = 1 if description claims card quality is Near Mint or Near Mint-Mint
Three - Dummy variable = 1 if auction is listed for 3 days
Five - Dummy variable = 1 if auction is listed for 5 days
Seven - Dummy variable = 1 if auction is listed for 7 days
Ten Omitted Dummy variable = 1 if auction is listed for 10 days
Weekend - Dummy variable = 1 if auction ended on a Saturday/Sunday
Picture + Dummy variable = 1 if a picture of the card is posted
Winfield + Dummy variable = 1 if card is of Dave Winfield
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
61
Tahle 12. Descriptive Statistics of Variables for Auction Models
All Races Blac c Hispanic White
Mean Std.Dev. Mean
Std.
Dev. Mean
Std.
Dev. Mean
Std.
Dev.
Full Price 1.936 0.829 2.125 0.825 1.421 0.945 1.785 0.772
Bid 0.602 0.650 0.429 0.569
Positive 5.555 1.643 5.650 1.788 5.476 1.079 5.454 1.544
Negative 0.442 0.688 0.521 0.750 0.000 0.000 0.409 0.638
Certified 1102 0.100 0.143 0.098
Claim Low O.305 0.333 0.143 0.294
Claim Med 0.280 0.417 0.000 0.157
Claim High 0.415 0.250 0.857 0.549
Tlires 0.034 0.033 0.000 0.039
Five 0.136 0.083 0.429 0.157
Seven 0.754 0.783 0.571 0.745
Ten 0.076 0.100 0.000 0.059
Weekend 0.449 0.367 0.857 0.490
Picture 0.822 0.750 1.000 0.882
Winfield 0.195 0.383 0.000 0.000
Card Price^̂ 2.680 1.317 3.215 1.222 1.614 0.219 2.197 1.244
Not Common 0.992 1.000 1.000 0.980
RoolJe 0.237 0.467 0.000 0.000
Not White 0.568 1.000 1.000 0.000
Black 0.508 1.000 0.000 0.000
Hispanic 0.059 0.000 1.000 0.000
Batting Average 0.278 0.018 0.285 0.014 0.292 0.015 0.267 0.016
Home Runs 379.797 168.56 427.750 152.00 266.571 115.20 338.922 177.11
Stolen Bases 164.373 151.27 239.367 166.07 173.000 149.03 74.961 58.481
Seasons as Player 19.085 2.928 20.383 2.179 16.571 1.134 17.902 3.158
Post Season G 28.873 17.543 29.667 19.703 15.714 6.130 29.745 15.223
Seasons as Mgr 1.407 4.223 0.550 2.418 1.286 3.402 2.431 5.612
All Star 0.983 1.000 1.000 0.961
Gold Gloves 3.839 4.070 3.417 3.110 1.571 3.309 4.647 4.943
Hail of Fame 0.627 0.800 0J71 0.431
M \P 0.492 0.400 0.429 0.608
Outfield 0.576 0.917 0.429 0.196
Catcher 0.085 0.000 0.000 0.196
Utility 0.178 0.083 0.143 0.294
Infield 0.339 0.083 0J71 0.608
N (Common/Total) 118 0/60 0/7 1/51
Note- Standard Deviations are not reported for binary variables.
Card Price, is the difference between the natural logarithm of the player’s Beckett card price and the 
common card price, shown here for comparison purposes only.
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Table 13. Regressions for Auction Models
Censorec Normal
Mode11 Mode 2
Coef. T-Stat Coef. T-Stat
Not White -0.622** 1.979
Black -0.571*^^ 1.619
Hispanic -0.699* 1.758
Positive 0.037 0.852 0.037 0.864
Negative 0.024 0.258 0.180 0.193
Certified 1.132*** 5.643 1.126*** 5.590
Claim Med 0.079 0.498 0.080 0.505
Claim High 0.324** 2.115 0.338** 2.118
Three -0.483 1.281 -0.471 1.243
Rve -0.585** 2.223 -0.570** 2.135
Seven -0.192 0.913 -0.192 0.914
Weekend -0.190 1.385 -0.185 1.348
Picture -0.212 1.270 -0.200 1.165
Winfield 1.907*** 2.814 1.893*** 2.790
Batting Average 12.264* 1.782 12.470* 1.810
Home Runs 0.002* 1.699 0.002* 1.720
Stolen Bases 0.001 1.563 0.0007 1.342
Seasons Player -0.026 0.684 -0.030 0.753
Post Season G 0.003 0.394 0.003 0.400
Seasons as Mgr -0.025 1.285 -0.025 1.272
Gold Gloves 0.009 0.322 0.010 0.371
Hall of Fame -0.216 0.799 -0.211 0.778
MVP 0.302 0.670 0.283 0.622
Rookie -0.207 0.416 -0.219 0.440
Catcher -0.163 0.383 -0.153 0.358
Utility 0.024 0.070 0.025 0.075
Infield -0.200 0.638 -0.177 0J52
Constant -2.025 0.887 -2.036 0.897
Log-Likelihood -64.921 -64.871
LR Statistic 124.84*** 124.95***
N (Censored/Total) 47/118 47/118
Censored Normal Regression Notes: Dependent variable. Full Price, is the natural logarithm of 
the final bid plus shipping costs.
The absolute value of the t-statistic is reported.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01(two-tailed t-tests)
40 The variable Black has a p-value of 0.109
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Table 14. Additional Tobit Regressions for Hitters Models
Mode 1 Mode12 Mode 3 Mode 4
Coef. T-Stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-Stat
Black -3.950 0.548 -0.092 0.744 -0.039 0.155 -0.977 0.726
Hispanic 1.652 0.234 -0.116 0.743 -0.045 0.128 -2.216 1.173
Home Runs 0.003*** 6.869
At Bats 2.95E"'*** 11.01 -0.00006 0.723 -8.64E" 1.089
Stolen Bases 0.001*** 3.963
Seasons Player -0.005 0.211 -0.009 0.412 0.034** 0.015
Post Season G 0.010*** 2.657 0.010*** 2.812 0.010*** 2.896 0.005 1.486
Seasons as Mgr 0.040*** 2.468 0.037** 2.253 0.037** 2.327 0.035*** 2.604
Offensive Avg -26.640** 2.259
Black*OA 16.957 0.591
Hispanic*OA -5.810 0.185
Rookie*OA 2.914 0.997
Offensive Avĝ 36.382*** 2.843
Black*OA^ -18.674 0.655
Hispanic*OA^ 3.768 0.109
League -0.113 1.165
Total Bases 0.0007*** 6.320 7.84E-^*** 6.219
Biack*TB -2.8E- 0.413
Hispanic*TB 2.27E" 0.212
Rookie*TB 2.9E^*** 2.611
Batting Average 5.518* 1.821
Black*BatAvg 2.855 0.575
Hispanic*BatAvg 7.010 1.021
Rookie*BatAvg 9.158 1.309
All Star 0.480*** 4.349
Gold Gloves 0.043** 2.372
Hall of Fame 0.588*** 3.078
MVP 0.315* 1.922
Rookie -0.653 0.477 0.539*** 2.751 -0.168 0.444 -1.734 0.965
First Base -0.109 0.738 -0.059 0.400 -0.049 0.342
Second Base -0.144 0.757 -0.163 0.891 -0.142 0.787
Short Stop 0.188 0.947 0.174 0.972 0.209 1.186
Third Base -0.155 0.877 -0.190 1.057 -0.179 1.010
Catcher 0.524*** 3.294 0.469 3.038 0.459*** 3.042 0.277** 2.037
Infield 0.064 0.658
Utility -0.225** 2.110
Constant 2.554 0.922 -1.631*** 6.443 -1.489*** 5.787 -2.668*** i 3.435
Log-likelihood -169.417 -176.003 -172.195 -149.743
LR statistic 389.09*** 375.91*** 383.53*** 428.43***
N (Common/Total) 209/336 209/336 209/336 209/336
Note: Dependent variable. Card Price, is the difference between the natural logarithm of the 
player’s card price and the common card price.
The absolute value of the t-statistic is reported.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01(two-tailed t-tests)
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Table 15. Additional Tobit Regressions for Pitchers Models
Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3 Mode 4
Coef. T-Stat Coef. T-Stat Coef. T-Stat Coef. T-Stat
Black -0.588** 2.031 -2.192 1.153 -0.641* 1.912 5.044 0.794
Hispanic -0.458 1.394 -0.143 0.065 -0.020 0.063 1.441 0.303
Wins 0.025*** 3.458 0.042*** 5.102 0.033*** 4.291 0.204*** 2.482
Losses 0.001 0.103
Saves 0.003** 2.257 0.005*** 3.315 0.004*** 2.940 0.003*** 2.061
Complete Games 0.002 0.808 0.002 0J35
Earned Runs -0.002* 1.844
Strikeouts 0.001*** 3.699
Strikeout/Walk 0.203 0.945 0.210 1.103
Black*Wins 0.009 1.105
Black*Saves 0.005 0.105
Hispanic* Wins 0.002 0.253
Hispanic*Saves -0.021 0.426
Earned Run 
Average -0.505** 2.046
Black*ERA -1.743 0.885
Hispanic*ERA -0.568 0.379
Innings Pitched -0.001 0.887 -0.002*** 3.546 -0.001*** 3.101 -7.23E^ 1.449
Post Season IP 0.005* 1.744 0.004 1.394
Seasons as Mgr 0.354** 2.079 0.306** 2.006 0.366** 2.273
All Star 0.366* 1.922 0.176 0.900
Hall of Fame 0.547* 1.876 0.362 1.086
MVP/Cy Young 0.428* 1.901 0.317 1.311
Gold Glove 0.038 1.108 -0.014 0.362
Rookie 0.467** 2.081 0.263 0.875 0.162 0.610 0.697*** 2.574
Post Season Games -0.002 0.142 -0.013 0.996
Age in 1974 -0.076*** 3.638 -0.084*** 4.187
Constant -1.400*** 6.788 -0.157 0.241 -0.302 0.504 0.042 0.048
Log-likelihood -79.0̂ 16 -82.975 -77.889 -82.3<[9
LR statistic 205.08 197.32*** 207.39*** 198.47***
N (Common/Total) 155/210 155/210 155/210 155/210
Note; Dependent variable, Card Price, is the difference between the natural logarithm of the 
player’s card price and the conunon card price.
The absolute value of the t-statistic is reported.
*pc0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01(two-tailed t-tests)
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